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Scientists around the globe have been warning about the risk of a potentialpandemic influenza outbreak.  Pandemic flu is caused by a new, severe
strain of the flu virus capable of producing severe disease and spreading 
rapidly person-to-person worldwide.  Unlike the seasonal flu, a pandemic flu
virus poses a novel threat since humans would have no previously developed
immunity against this new virus strain, putting most people at high risk for 
infection.  This could result in a large percentage of the world’s population
being infected by a rapidly spreading virus in a very short period of time.
Experts predict a severe pandemic flu out-
break could result in up to 1.9 million
deaths in the United States, approximately
9.9 million Americans needing to be hospi-
talized, and an economic recession with loss-
es of over $680 billion to the U.S. Gross
Domestic Product.1
How to treat and care for the nation’s 73.6
million children and adolescents during an
influenza pandemic is a significant concern.2
Children are not “small adults.” Special con-
sideration needs to be given to complicated
issues ranging from:
■ Child-appropriate doses of vaccine and
medications;
■ Management and treatment of children
who are ill; 
■ Including children in strategies to slow the
spread of influenza in communities; and
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PART I: Introduction, Background, and Overview
IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE HEALTH AND WELFARE OF CHILDREN ARE
CONSIDERED IN ALL ASPECTS OF INFLUENZA PLANNING, INCLUDING PREPARATION FOR
A POSSIBLE PANDEMIC INFLUENZA OUTBREAK. 
– JAY BERKELHAMER, MD, FAAP, President, American Academy of Pediatrics, October 26, 2006.
“
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2■ Caring for and supervising healthy children
if schools and childcare facilities are closed
for extended periods of time.  
It is difficult to predict the impact of a future
influenza pandemic on children, although
children are known to suffer a significant bur-
den from seasonal flu. Statistics regarding chil-
dren in past pandemics are elusive, although
children certainly became sick and died. In
the 1918 “Spanish flu” pandemic, healthy
young adults were the hardest hit, rather than
the usual high-risk groups (i.e., young infants
and the elderly) seen with the seasonal flu.
More recently, children have been dispropor-
tionately affected by the avian flu virus that is
circulating in Asia and elsewhere. 
The American Academy of Pediatrics
(AAP) and Trust for America’s Health
(TFAH) recommend specific actions to
ensure that the health and welfare of the
nation’s children are protected in the event
of an influenza pandemic.
This issue brief examines strategic
approaches for containing the spread of a
pandemic in children and adolescents,
which include limiting social interaction,
developing potential medical interventions
such as vaccines and anti-viral medication,
the use of masks and respirators, and edu-
cating children, families, and communities
on what to do and how to do it.
Seasonal Influenza -- Most Americans have had some experience with seasonal flu, a respi-
ratory illness that strikes annually. Seasonal flu is not a benign illness -- it kills about 36,000 and
hospitalizes over 200,000 people in the United States every year.3 Yet some experts generally
regard it as a manageable public health problem, since many people have some form of immu-
nity, and a yearly vaccine is available.  
Pandemic (from the Greek, meaning “of all of the people’’) Influenza has the potential to pose
a far greater threat to global health. It typically is a novel human flu that causes a worldwide out-
break of serious illness and death. Because there is little natural immunity, the disease can easily
spread from person to person, one of the key characteristics that defines a pandemic. 
There have been at least 10 recorded flu pandemics during the past 300 years.4 Three of
these occurred during the 20th Century.
1. The 1918-1919 “Spanish Flu” was the most devastating flu pandemic in recent history. It
killed more than 500,000 Americans and as many as 50 million people globally, according to
some estimates. It proved especially lethal to young adults.
2. The 1957-1958 “Asian Flu” was first identified in China and killed approximately 1 mil-
lion people worldwide, including 68,000 Americans.
3. The 1968-1969 “Hong Kong Flu” caused about 34,000 deaths in the United States.5
Scientific experts believe that another potentially deadly influenza pandemic is inevitable.
Unanswered questions include when it will occur, how severe it will be, and whether the
world will be prepared to cope with it.  
SEASONAL VS. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
AT THE MOMENT, THERE ARE MORE QUESTIONS THAN THERE ARE ANSWERS. WE
KNOW WHAT THE ISSUES ARE. WE JUST DON’T KNOW WHAT THE ANSWERS ARE.
– JOHN S. BRADLEY, MD, FAAP, Children Hospital San Diego, California.
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3AVIAN FLU (H5N1) IN HUMANS
Fears about pandemic influenza have inten-
sified in recent years with the emergence of
a deadly strain of avian (bird) flu.  The virus,
H5N1, has mainly circulated in Asia,
although cases in birds have been reported
as far north as England, while human cases
have been reported as far west as Nigeria.
As of October 2, 2007, there have been 329
laboratory-confirmed human cases caused
by the H5N1 virus and 201 deaths, which
represents a staggering 61 percent mortality
rate.6 Most alarming is the high number of
cases resulting in death in children and ado-
lescents. Children and teens between the
ages of 0-19 account for nearly 46 percent of
all H5N1 “bird” flu deaths.7
4Seasonal flu is regarded as predictable and poses an important threat to the unvaccinated,
especially young children. In evaluating the potential needs of children should a global pandemic
begin, it is instructive to understand how vulnerable they are during seasonal episodes of flu --
and how important it is to prevent them from becoming infected.
In recent years federal health officials have expanded the age range for recommended seasonal
flu vaccination of children. Currently, CDC recommends that all children between the ages of 
6-59 months of age receive the annual flu vaccine and that previously unvaccinated children
from 5 through 8 years of age receive 2 doses of vaccine the first time they are vaccinated.68
Children younger than 2 years old, even if they are otherwise healthy, are more likely than older
children to be hospitalized with serious complications if they become ill with influenza. These com-
plications can include pneumonia, dehydration, worsening of long-term medical problems like heart
disease or asthma, encephalopathy, and other bacterial infections, including sinus and ear infections.
In some cases, these complications can lead to death. It is estimated that each year in the U.S., there
are more than 20,000 children younger than 5 years of age hospitalized due to flu. Also, there is an
under-recognized burden of influenza in young children, with outpatient visits 10 to 250 times as
common as hospitalizations, with the highest rates in children 24-59 months of age.69
CDC began collecting reports of seasonal influenza-associated deaths among children in 2003.
Influenza-associated deaths in children became a nationally reportable condition in 2004, mean-
ing that health professionals are required to report such cases to the federal government. 
The annual number of deaths among children reported to CDC for the past 4 influenza sea-
sons has ranged from a low of 44 during 2004-2005 to a high of 153 during 2003-2004, but
probably represents an underestimate of the true number of deaths due to a lack of recogni-
tion and underreporting.70
Of 153 laboratory-confirmed influenza-related pediatric deaths reported during the 2003-2004
influenza season, 96 deaths were in children younger than 5 years of age, and 61 in children
younger than 2 years of age. Among the 149 children who died and for whom information on
underlying health status was available, 100 did not have an underlying medical condition that
was an indication for vaccination at that time.71 These statistics represent the highest mortality
rate for a vaccine-preventable illness in recent years.
In California during the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 influenza seasons, 51 percent of children with
laboratory-confirmed influenza who died, and 40 percent of those who required admission to an
intensive care unit, had no underlying medical conditions. These data indicate that, although deaths
are more common among children with risk factors for influenza complications, the majority of
pediatric deaths occur among children of all age groups with no known high-risk conditions.72
Vaccine Coverage Rates for Children
Vaccination rates among children at increased risk for influenza complications remain low.
Coverage among children aged 2-17 years with asthma for the 2004-05 influenza season was
estimated to be 29 percent. However, one study reported 79 percent vaccination coverage
among children attending a Cystic Fibrosis treatment center.73
During the first season that CDC recommended that all children aged 6-23 months be vacci-
nated, only 33 percent received more than one dose and 18 percent received 2 doses of
influenza vaccine.74
Among children enrolled in Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) who had received a first
dose during 2001-2004, second dose coverage varied from 29 to 44 percent among children aged
6-23 months and from 12 to 24 percent among children aged 2-8 years.75
Data collected in February 2005 indicated a national estimate of 48 percent vaccination 
coverage for more than one dose among children aged 6-23 months and 35 percent coverage
among children aged 2-17 years who had one or more high-risk medical conditions during the
2004-05 season.76
SEASONAL FLU AND CHILDREN
5Studies have indicated that school children
are the population group most responsible for
transmission of contagious respiratory viruses,
including influenza.  They have a high attack
rate of influenza infection because they have
limited pre-existing immunity and once infect-
ed, transmit influenza viruses to many others
even before they themselves have recogniza-
ble symptoms.8 Moreover, numerous studies
have demonstrated the extent to which chil-
dren act as efficient disease vectors, spreading
infection not only throughout classroom set-
tings, but secondarily at home.  In turn, there
is tertiary spread from the parent to the work-
place and from the siblings to daycare and
school settings.9
Public health experts agree that children
infected with influenza are major transmit-
ters of the disease. Children gather in groups
-- in school, in daycare settings, on play-
grounds, in households -- and often are unin-
tentionally careless when it comes to their
personal hygiene.  They cough and sneeze,
often without using a tissue. Many children
cough into their hands, and then touch
other objects -- a door knob, a computer
mouse or keyboard, toys -- or other people,
including other children, rather than cough-
ing or sneezing into their sleeves, which
many pediatricians consider the next best
alternative to using a tissue. Not surprisingly,
it is challenging to try to teach very young
children “cough etiquette,” and to get them
to wash their hands frequently. 
Children also shed higher levels of influenza
virus for longer periods of time than adults.10
All of these factors place family members and
others with whom children have contact,
such as other children, daycare providers and
teachers, and vulnerable groups, such as eld-
erly grandparents, at an increased risk of
infection.  The risk of secondary transmission
of seasonal flu within households is known to
be inversely proportional to the age of the
person who brings influenza into the house-
hold: the younger the person, the greater the
risk to other family members.11
PART II: Strategies to Limit Social Interaction in Children
to Contain the Spread of an Influenza Pandemic
CHILDREN ARE INHERENTLY MORE AT RISK BECAUSE THEY CONGREGATE IN
GROUPS. THEY LIKE TO ‘SHARE’ THEIR SECRETIONS. THEY WON’T SHARE THEIR TOYS,
BUT ARE HAPPY TO SHARE THEIR GERMS.  WE CAN EXPECT THEM TO BECOME
INFECTED -- AND TO INFECT OTHERS. 
–  MARGARET C. FISHER, MD, FAAP, Chair of the Department of Pediatrics and Medical
Director, The Children’s Hospital at Monmouth Medical Center, Long Branch, New Jersey.
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6Social distancing is a term used by public
health experts to describe measures such as
school and daycare closures, telecommuting
or staggered shifts for the workforce, and
cancellation of public gatherings to minimize
the transmission of disease.  Community mit-
igation strategies and nonpharmaceutical
interventions are terms also used by public
health officials when referring to communi-
ty-based interventions intended to limit dis-
ease transmission in the absence of vaccines
or medications.
In the event of an influenza pandemic, com-
munities likely will have to make difficult deci-
sions about the most effective ways to reduce
transmission of the virus - - actions that will
have profound social and educational ramifi-
cations on children. For example, children
faced with extended school or daycare clos-
ings could become increasingly isolated, expe-
riencing serious disruption of their social and
educational development during a time in
their lives when they are already vulnerable.
Parents will have to stay home from work to
care for their children, limiting their produc-
tivity and contributions to the economy.
The extent of the community response will
depend on how serious any pandemic turns
out to be.  The U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) has created a
Pandemic Severity Index (PSI) using case
fatality ratios to determine the severity of a
pandemic. Using the PSI as a guide, CDC
recommends what communities should do
to reduce transmission of the virus.
The severity levels range from 1 to 5, with 1
being the least severe. At the lowest level,
health officials recommend voluntary meas-
ures, including isolation and quarantine, but
do not recommend that schools or work-
places be closed, or that public gatherings be
canceled. Suggestions for containment
increase with the severity of the pandemic. At
level 5, for example, the government recom-
mends schools and daycare facilities be closed
and public gatherings canceled for as long as
the transmission of the pandemic virus is
occurring, possibly for as long as 3 months. In
addition, at level 5, businesses should modify
workplace schedules to keep people separat-
ed and implement telecommuting alterna-
tives to workplace attendance.12
In September-October 2006, a Harvard
School of Public Health public opinion poll
was conducted to explore the willingness of
Americans to comply with community mitiga-
tion or social distancing measures.  More than
three-fourths of the almost 1,700 respondents
indicated that they would cooperate if public
health officials recommended that they cur-
tail various activities in their daily lives like
attending religious services, going to the mall,
or using public transportation for one
month.13 Respondents were not asked about
their willingness to comply with these recom-
mendations for longer time periods.
WE KNOW THAT GATHERING PEOPLE TOGETHER IS A GOOD WAY TO
TRANSMIT RESPIRATORY VIRUSES, SO ALL OF THESE SOCIAL DISTANCING SUGGESTIONS
MAKE PERFECTLY GOOD EPIDEMIOLOGICAL AND INFECTION-CONTROL SENSE. HOWEVER,
THE QUESTION IS WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAKE PRACTICAL SENSE -- AND HOW
DO WE DEAL WITH THAT? 
--Lorry Glen Rubin, MD, FAAP, Schneider Children’s Hospital, New Hyde Park, New York.
“
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SOCIAL DISTANCING
7Legend:
Generally Not Recommended = Unless there is a compelling rationale for specific populations or
jurisdictions, measures are generally not recommended for entire populations as the consequences may
outweigh the benefits.
Consider = Important to consider these alternatives as part of a prudent planning strategy, considering
characteristics of the pandemic, such as age-specific illness rate, geographic distribution, and the magni-
tude of adverse consequences.  These factors may vary globally, nationally, and locally.
Recommended = Generally recommended as an important component of the planning strategy.
*All of these interventions should be used in combination with other infection control measures, including
hand hygiene, cough etiquette, and personal protective equipment such as face masks.  Additional informa-
tion on infection control measures is available at www.pandemicflu.gov.
Summary of the Community Mitigation Strategy by Pandemic Severity14
8Preventive school closures, which might last
weeks or even months, would halt the oper-
ation of the educational system as currently
structured, leaving millions of displaced stu-
dents in need of alternative means of formal
education. Additionally, in a pandemic,
many daycare and childcare centers may be
required to follow the lead of the local
school system and close to limit disease
transmission among their populations.
Closing schools or childcare centers once a
pandemic is widespread in a community
may not significantly halt the spread of dis-
ease.15 Therefore, identifying the optimal
time to initiate preventive school closures
will be challenging for government officials
because “implementation needs to be early
enough to preclude the initial steep upslope
in case numbers and long enough to cover
the peak of the anticipated epidemic while
avoiding intervention fatigue.”16
At the onset of a pandemic, many parents
may voluntarily choose to keep their chil-
dren at home even if schools remain open
in order to reduce possible exposure to
infection in a school setting.  However, it is
uncertain how families might respond dur-
ing prolonged disruptions in their daily lives
and if adherence rates can be sustained over
several months.17
There could be significant social and educa-
tional implications for children and adoles-
cents who are out of school for an extended
period of time.  Despite evidence that social
distancing may be a good strategy to reduce
the spread of infection, there are additional
concerns about the behavioral, cognitive,
and social impact on children and adoles-
cents that could result from closing their
schools and daycare facilities.  Schools not
only educate children but also socialize
them. School and day care settings are
places where developmental skills are
honed and where children learn to interact
with others.  For many, it is also a site of nur-
turing and growth, and where friendships
are formed. 
Many children of lower socio-economic sta-
tus also rely on school as their major source
of nutrition. The National School Lunch
Program operates in approximately 100,000
public and private schools and residential
childcare institutions, and the School
Breakfast Program operates in about 80,000
schools.  School lunch and breakfast are
free for students at or below 130 percent of
the poverty level and are available at
reduced price for students between 130 per-
cent and 185 percent poverty level.  Half of
the 30 million students that participate in
the National School Lunch Program
received free meals in 2006.18 If a flu pan-
demic resulted in school closures, steps
would need to be taken to ensure that chil-
dren continue to receive proper nutrition.
Could children continue their education
during an extended school closure? A com-
bination of planned extended lessons and
home schooling may supplement formal
education and allow students to maintain
skills while schools are closed. This will
require extensive planning by the school sys-
tem and a “learning compact” between
school and home. Assuming that communi-
cation, mail, and other critical infrastruc-
ture systems remain intact, tests, e-lessons,
supplementary materials, and teacher-stu-
dent interaction may support this process.
SCHOOL CLOSURES
ISOLATING FAMILIES IS BETTER THAN PEOPLE CONTINUING TO MEET. BUT THE
QUESTION IS: HOW DOES THAT HAPPEN? HOW CAN PEOPLE MISS WORK? HOW CAN
CHILDREN MISS SCHOOL? THOSE ARE THE MILLION DOLLAR QUESTIONS.
– HENRY H. BERNSTEIN, DO, FAAP, Chief, General Academic Pediatrics, 
Children’s Hospital at Dartmouth, Lebanon, New Hampshire
“
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9However, distance-learning models for
ongoing education are not likely to be with-
in reach of all school systems and all house-
holds, especially those in disadvantaged
areas. For school districts that can imple-
ment this option, distance learning may
take advantage of Internet technologies that
support real-time interaction between stu-
dents and teachers, sharing of educational
materials, submission of assignments, and
automated grading of certain types of
assignments in real time. Consideration
must be given to the amount of time
required to implement distance-learning
software, create Internet access to the soft-
ware for students and teachers, and train
students and teachers to use these pro-
grams.19 Also, there is increasing concern
that there may not be sufficient band width
to support telecommuting, educational
activities, and continuity of business opera-
tions in the private sector.
Long-term school closures would impact
entire families. Young children unable to
attend school will be in need of adult super-
vision during the day.  Some working par-
ents may be able to make arrangements with
friends, family, or alternative childcare facil-
ities. However, childcare alternatives may
not be available to a large proportion of
working parents due to physical, emotional,
economic, medical, or other factors. 
Working parents may be forced to take
extended leave from work to provide child-
care during a severe flu pandemic. When the
2006 Harvard School of Public Health public
opinion survey questioned respondents about
possible financial difficulties due to missed
work, three-quarters (74 percent) believed
that they could miss work for 7-10 days without
having serious financial problems. However,
more than half (57 percent) believed they
would have serious financial problems if they
had to miss work for 1 month, and three-quar-
ters (76 percent) of respondents thought they
would experience serious economic hardship
if they were out of work for 3 months due to a
severe pandemic.20 The disruption of school
and work for children and adults alike can
lead to physical, mental, social, economic, psy-
chological, and financial stress as individuals
struggle to ensure a balance between protect-
ing and providing for their loved ones.
Additionally, in the event of a pandemic, it
is likely that restrictions on social gatherings
and extensive community-wide closures will
follow. Closures will lead to significant eco-
nomic losses across a large number of indus-
tries. Curtailing social interactions can lead
to social unrest and feelings of loneliness
and isolation. Crime and participation in
violent, unhealthy behaviors might be pur-
sued by individuals who are deprived of reg-
ular social and recreational activities. 
■ In the U.S., there are over 54.5 million primary and secondary school students.25
■ Approximately one-fifth of the U.S. population attends or works in schools.26
■ Sixty percent of the 20.7 million children ages 0-5 nationwide are enrolled in center-based
early childhood learning programs.27
■ In 2005, 6.9 percent of K-8 pupils nationwide participated in academic after-school activities.28
■ In 2006, 101,000 schools participated in the National School Lunch Program and served 30
million children each school day.29
■ Nearly 22 million school days are lost annually due to the common cold alone.30
FAST FACTS: Schools and Early Childhood Education in the U.S. 
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There is evidence that strategies to limit social interaction in communities can be a very success-
ful tool in reducing transmission during a pandemic -- if these measures are imposed quickly. 
During the 1918 flu pandemic, in cities where public health officials took measures to limit public
gatherings within a few days after the first local cases were identified, peak weekly death rates were
up to 50 percent less than cities that waited just a few weeks before responding. Two historical analy-
ses published in April 2007 showed that non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as restricting social
gatherings, limited the spread of the virus.21 These studies demonstrated that public health inter-
ventions limiting social interaction effectively curbed the transmission of influenza virus in 1918, and
death rates were reduced more dramatically the sooner these measures were put in place.22
For instance, St. Louis took quick action compared with the city of Philadelphia. St. Louis
introduced a broad series of public health measures to contain the flu within 2 days of the first
reported cases.  Philadelphia used similar measures, but took more than 2 weeks to imple-
ment them; a city-wide parade took place prior to imposing its ban on public gatherings. The
peak mortality rate in St. Louis was only one-eighth that of Philadelphia.23
In addition, schools, theaters, churches, and dance halls were closed in various cities.  Kansas
City banned weddings and funerals if more than 20 people were to be in attendance. New
York required that factories stagger shifts to reduce rush hour commuter traffic. Seattle’s
mayor ordered citizens to wear face masks.24
A World Health Organization (WHO) expert panel found that during the relatively mild 1957-1958
pandemic, infections increased in some countries following public gatherings, such as conferences
and festivals. This panel also concluded that, in many countries, pandemic influenza spread most rap-
idly in camps, army units, and schools, suggesting that avoiding crowds can help reduce transmission. 
LIMITING SOCIAL INTERACTION - TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE
YOU MAY BE ABLE TO CLOSE SCHOOLS, BUT YOU CAN’T ALWAYS CONTROL
WHERE KIDS GO. IF THEY CONGREGATE ON PLAYGROUNDS, ALL YOU’VE DONE IS
MOVED THE SITE OF TRANSMISSION.
--  JOHN S. BRADLEY, MD, FAAP, Children’s Hospital of San Diego, California.
“
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Since the best way to reduce the role of chil-
dren in spreading influenza is to ensure that
they do not become infected, many public
health experts believe that mass immuniza-
tion of children would be an effective tool in
curbing widespread community transmis-
sion.  However, a pandemic flu vaccine well-
matched with the circulating strain is not
likely to be widely available for at least 6
months after the onset of a pandemic out-
break.  That is why the federal government
is undertaking pre-pandemic activities to
address the initial critical 6 month period. 
For example, in April 2007, FDA approved a
vaccine for the H5N1 “avian flu” virus for
use in adults; however, this vaccine is expect-
ed to primarily protect against one of the
virus strains predicted to have the potential
to cause pandemic flu. It is administered
through 2 intramuscular injections given 1
month apart.31
The pre-pandemic vaccine is meant to offer
some protection during the early months of
a pandemic while a more precise vaccine --
tailored to the specific pandemic strain - - is
developed and manufactured. Should the
virus undergo changes that would acceler-
ate its spread among people, a new vaccine
must be created and produced, which could
take 6 months or longer before sufficient
production of a new vaccine is possible.  
The newly approved vaccine is manufactured
by sanofi pasteur,32 but will not be sold com-
mercially. Instead, the vaccine has been pur-
chased by the U.S. government for the
Strategic National Stockpile for distribution
by public health officials to states when need-
ed. The federal government expects to have
enough of the pre-pandemic vaccine for an
estimated 20 million of the nation’s 300 mil-
lion people. The government currently has
12 million doses, or enough for 6 million peo-
ple, assuming that 2 doses will be required to
stimulate the appropriate immune reaction.33
However, at this time, the pre-pandemic vac-
cine is approved only for use in persons 18-
64 years of age. A government-sponsored
study looking at safety and immunogenicity
in children ages 2-9 years of age currently is
underway at 3 National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases-sponsored Vaccine
Treatment Evaluation Units. So far, the vac-
cine has been well-tolerated in children.
The final data analysis is continuing.34
This section examines the status of medical
strategies -- vaccines, anti-viral medications,
masks and respirators, and isolation in
health care facilities -- for trying to contain
the spread of a pandemic influenza in chil-
dren and adolescents.
PART III: Medical Interventions to Limit the Spread 
of a Pandemic in Children 
CHILDREN WILL BE THE MAJOR VECTORS, JUST LIKE THEY ARE EVERY SINGLE
YEAR. ANY VACCINE STRATEGY THAT DOESN’T INCLUDE THEM IS FOOLISH. 
-- MARGARET C. FISHER, MD, FAAP, Chair of the Department of Pediatrics and Medical
Director, The Children’s Hospital at Monmouth Medical Center, Long Branch, New Jersey.
“ ”
VACCINES
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The National Institutes of Health plans to
study the pre-pandemic vaccine in children
younger than 2 years, as this group would
likely to be at high risk for hospitalization
with pandemic influenza as they are with
seasonal influenza. There are no plans to
study the vaccine in children 10-17 years
because the data in adults, elderly and --
thus far - - in children 2-9 years of age sug-
gest they would respond similarly to the
same doses of vaccine. 
Typically, those with underlying medical con-
ditions, the elderly, children from 6 months
through 59 months of age, as well as health
care workers and other essential personnel
are given higher priority for vaccination.
When vaccines are in short supply, healthy
children over 5 years of age usually fall near
the bottom of vaccine priority lists -- despite
some studies that point to the value of mass
immunization of schoolchildren in reducing
community-level infection.
The federal government has a strategic
response plan for pandemic flu, but no final
decisions have been made regarding vaccine
priorities. The plan includes recommenda-
tions from 2 federal advisory committees - -
the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP) and the National Vaccine
Advisory Committee (NVAC). Both groups
have proposed that medically high-risk indi-
viduals and front-line emergency personnel
receive immunizations first, should a vaccine
become available. Otherwise healthy individ-
uals ages 2-64 years - - an estimated 179.3 mil-
lion people -- are at the bottom of the initial
priority lists.35 
Later this year, the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) will make final
recommendations regarding pandemic vac-
cine priority groups after a series of town
meetings and other public forums. The
HHS recommendations will then be sent to
state public health officials, who will ulti-
mately decide who gets the vaccine first.36
FOR SEASONAL FLU, THE DOSE FOR AGE 3 AND ABOVE IS THE SAME AS IT IS FOR
ADULTS, WHILE THE DOSE FOR AGES 6 MONTHS THROUGH 35 MONTHS IS HALF THE
DOSE AS ADULTS. WE DON’T KNOW YET IF THE SAME THING WILL BE TRUE FOR AVIAN
FLU. ALSO, IF ADULTS NEED 2 DOSES, KIDS PROBABLY WILL NEED 2 DOSES TOO. 
-- LORRY GLEN RUBIN, MD, FAAP,  Schneider Children’s Hospital, New Hyde Park, New York.  
“
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A PHYSICIAN RECOMMENDATION FOR VACCINATION AND THE PERCEPTION
THAT HAVING A CHILD BE VACCINATED ‘IS A SMART IDEA’ WERE ASSOCIATED POSITIVELY
WITH LIKELIHOOD OF VACCINATION OF CHILDREN AGED 6-23 MONTHS.
-- FROM CDC’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON IMMUNIZATION PRACTICES SEASONAL INFLUENZA
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 2007-08. 
“
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I THINK THAT, IN THE EVENT OF A REAL PANDEMIC, VACCINE SHOULD BE GIVEN
TO INFANTS BASED ON THE IMMUNOGENICITY DATA THAT WE HAVE IN ADULTS, YOUNG
CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLY...AND THE FACT THAT PANDEMIC FLU VACCINES ARE NOT
MANUFACTURED DIFFERENTLY THAN THE SEASONAL VACCINE, WHICH IS LICENSED FOR
KIDS DOWN TO 6 MONTHS OF AGE. THAT IMPLIES THAT SAFETY IS NOT LIKELY TO BE
AN IMPORTANT ISSUE IN INFANTS. THE REAL ISSUE IS THAT THE CURRENTLY LICENSED
H5N1 VACCINE IS ONLY MODESTLY IMMUNOGENIC, REGARDLESS OF AGE, AND, OF
COURSE, WE HAVE NO EFFICACY DATA. REGARDLESS, IN AN ACTUAL PANDEMIC, MODEST
IMMUNOGENICITY BEATS NO IMMUNOGENICITY AT ALL.
-- KEN ZANGWILL, MD, Division of Pediatric Infectious Diseases, UCLA Center for Vaccine
Research, Harbor-UCLA Medical Center, Torrance, California.
“
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■ In December 2006, NIH began clinical trials of another H5N1 vaccine candidate. Clinical
trials will continue throughout this year.38
■ The government also is funding research into more rapid and flexible alternatives to the
chicken egg technology currently used to produce seasonal influenza-related vaccines. As
an example, use of cell cultures to produce vaccines is already standard practice with many
other modern vaccines.  This cell-based technology is being studied for seasonal and pan-
demic vaccine production and it may allow enough influenza vaccine to be made for every
American within 6 months after developing a product tailored to the specific pandemic viral
strain. HHS plans to ask commercial vaccine manufacturers to look at other promising
approaches, including the development of recombinant vaccines.39
■ In January 2007, the federal government awarded $132.5 million to 3 vaccine manufacturers
to develop adjuvanted vaccines against the H5N1 influenza virus.40
ADDITIONAL FLU VACCINE RESEARCH
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“Based on what we know about the role kids play in seasonal flu -- and
the impact -- we can only extrapolate that it is going to be magnified
during a pandemic.”  
-- HENRY H. BERNSTEIN, DO, FAAP, Chief, General Academic Pediatrics, Children’s Hospital at
Dartmouth, Lebanon, New Hampshire
Several studies underscore the potential importance of mass immunization of schoolchildren
in preventing influenza infection in the community:
■ A study conducted in Tecumseh, Michigan showed that immunization of 85 percent of all
schoolchildren against influenza resulted in a 3-fold reduction in the infection rate in other
age groups, compared with a neighboring community where schoolchildren were not the
focus of vaccination.41
■ A Japanese study published in 2001 demonstrated that immunization of 50-85 percent of
schoolchildren was associated with a significant drop in deaths among unvaccinated elderly dur-
ing influenza epidemics. The vaccination of Japanese schoolchildren prevented about 37,000 to
49,000 deaths per year, or about one death for every 420 children vaccinated. When vaccination
of schoolchildren was discontinued, the excess death rates in Japan once again increased.42
■ A 2005 pilot study compared the impact of  FluMist (a vaccine delivered by a nasal spray)
administered to children in one Maryland elementary school with 2 other demographically simi-
lar schools where the vaccine was not offered.  Again, the results showed a significant reduction
in fever and/or respiratory illnesses within households of pupils who received the vaccine.43
■ A Russian study published in 2006 analyzed the impact of mass vaccination of children on
unvaccinated elderly people living in their homes, and found 3 to 4 times fewer episodes of
influenza-like illnesses, as well as a decrease in conditions that often result as complications
from the flu.44 This study concludes that “although these findings may not be applicable imme-
diately in many developed countries, where a high proportion of elderly people are vaccinated
on an annual basis, the finding may be far more relevant in a pandemic situation where there is
insufficient vaccine available to cover both children and the elderly and some form of prioritiza-
tion has to be introduced. Targeting children for vaccination against influenza may protect the
unvaccinated elderly and may contribute towards preparing pandemic vaccination strategies.”45
CHILDREN AND SEASONAL FLU VACCINATIONS
ANTIVIRAL MEDICATIONS:
SOME PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS SPEAK OF UNIVERSAL VACCINATION AGAINST
INFLUENZA, MEANING A RECOMMENDATION FOR ALL AGE GROUPS -- BUT
SCHOOLCHILDREN, AGED 5 TO 18 YEARS, ARE A PRIME TARGET AS THEY ARE
GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF
COMMUNITY-WIDE TRANSMISSION.37
-- M.E. HALLORAN AND I.M. LONGINI, “Community Studies for Vaccinating Schoolchildren
Against Influenza,’’ Science, February 2006.
“
”
Because vaccines will likely be unavailable
during the first wave of an influenza pan-
demic, antiviral drugs and other therapeu-
tics will likely be the only initial defense
against illness. Antibiotics are effective
only against bacteria.  They do not work
against the viruses that cause influenza,
although they could be useful against sec-
ondary bacterial infections that sometimes
occur with flu.
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Two drugs, oseltamivir (known commercial-
ly as Tamiflu) and, to a much lesser extent,
zanamivir (known commercially as Relenza),
are neuraminidase inhibitors that may be
used to treat people infected by the H5N1
virus, and public health officials are focusing
on these drugs as primary treatments in the
event of a pandemic.
Tamiflu and Relenza have been shown effec-
tive against H5N1 in the laboratory, but it is
still unclear what impact they will have dur-
ing a pandemic. A trial is currently underway
in Southeast Asia studying the efficacy of dif-
ferent doses of Tamiflu among hospitalized
children and adults diagnosed with either
severe seasonal flu or avian flu. No prelimi-
nary data on this trial are yet available.46
Pediatric infectious disease experts and oth-
ers are concerned, however, because neither
Tamiflu nor Relenza is licensed at this time
for children younger than 1 year of age.
There also have been a few reports, mostly
from Japan, of children causing self-injury
or experiencing delirium (confusion, hallu-
cinations, speech problems) while using
Tamiflu -- although the drug has not been
proved to be the cause.47 At the same time,
infants are at high risk for complications if
they become ill with influenza and will be
especially vulnerable during a pandemic if a
vaccine is delayed or unavailable.
The National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) has a study
underway examining the safety and efficacy
of Tamiflu in children from birth through
23 months of age. The study is starting with
the older children and working its way down
to infants. Researchers hope to find out
whether the drug is safe in infants and
young children, and at what dose. The study
is expected to continue until April 2009.48
There are several doses and formulations of
Tamiflu available, including a flavored liquid.
The government recently approved 2 new
lower dosage formulations of Tamiflu for
children, at 30 and 45 milligrams. Roche, the
company that manufactures Tamiflu, also
makes a standard 75-mg capsule for adults.
Tamiflu has proved useful as a preventive
measure during influenza outbreaks in
group settings like nursing homes and dor-
mitories. But, if the drug is in short supply,
it will not likely be used routinely to prevent
infections during a pandemic.
In January 2007, HHS awarded $103 million
to develop a new influenza antiviral drug,
peramivir, which appears to be effective in
laboratory tests against a number of influen-
za strains. Further studies will test whether
this drug can treat seasonal and other life-
threatening influenza viruses such as
H5N1.49 The drug is another neu-
raminidase inhibitor given by a single injec-
tion into the muscle and is comparable to 5
days of treatment with other existing agents.
It also can be delivered intravenously.  
As with vaccines, the federal government and
the states have been buying antiviral drugs,
mostly Tamiflu, with the goal of stockpiling
enough treatment courses (81 million) for 25
percent of the U.S. population, a figure that
includes children. The drug manufacturer
has made the drug available at below market
cost. HHS plans to buy 50 million treatment
courses to distribute to states based on their
population; the remaining 31 million will be
purchased directly by the states, partially sub-
sidized by the federal government. HHS has
purchased or has on hand approximately 36
million antiviral treatment courses. Almost all
of the states have taken advantage of a feder-
al discount plan and, to date, have purchased
more than 12 million treatment courses.50
Also, HHS has thus far purchased 100,000
treatment courses of the flavored liquid
Tamiflu specifically for children.51
On July 19, 2005, NVAC voted unanimously
in favor of antiviral drug use priorities during
a pandemic influenza outbreak.  The recom-
mendations were made considering pandem-
ic response goals, assumptions on the
impacts of a pandemic, and after thorough
review of past pandemics, annual influenza
disease, data on antiviral drug impacts, and
recommendations for pandemic vaccine use.
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Children between 12-23 months of age were
included in the top 5 priority groups initial-
ly identified by NVAC as follows: 
1. Patients admitted to hospitals (estimated
10 million individuals);
2. Health care workers with direct patient
contact and emergency medical providers
(estimated 9.2 million individuals); 
3. Highest risk outpatients -- immunocom-
promised persons and pregnant women
(estimated 2.5 million individuals); 
4. Pandemic health responders (public
health, vaccinators, vaccine and antiviral
manufacturers), public safety (police, fire
corrections), and government decision-mak-
ers (estimated 3.3 million individuals); and 
5. Increased at-risk outpatients, including
young children 12-23 months old, persons
over 65 years of age and persons with under-
lying medical conditions (estimated 85.5
million individuals).52
NVAC considered the primary goal of a pan-
demic response to decrease the impact on
health, including severe morbidity and
death. Minimizing societal and economic
impacts were considered secondary and terti-
ary goals respectively.53 Currently, there is an
effort underway to revise these recommen-
dations based on additional information and
the possibility of increased antiviral supplies. 
Currently, there are 4 drugs available to treat and/or prevent seasonal influenza. These are
amantadine, rimantadine, zanamivir (Relenza) and oseltamivir (Tamiflu). The FDA has approved
all of them to treat, and most of them to prevent, seasonal flu caused by influenza A, while only
zanamavir and oseltamivir are able to treat and prevent seasonal flu caused by influenza B. 
However, during recent flu seasons -- and for the coming 2007-2008 flu season -- CDC has
recommended against using amantadine and rimantadine for the treatment or prevention of
seasonal flu because influenza A viruses are becoming increasingly resistant to both drugs.
Resistance develops when the virus has mutated (changed) in a way that makes a drug ineffec-
tive against it. CDC has urged that these 2 drugs not be used again until circulating influenza A
viruses once again become susceptible to them.54
The first 2 drugs work by inhibiting the activity of the influenza virus M2 protein, making it dif-
ficult for the virus to make copies of itself once it enters a cell. These drugs are effective only
against type A influenza.
The second 2 drugs represent the first of a different class of antiviral drugs known as neu-
raminidase inhibitors. The surfaces of flu viruses are sprinkled with neuraminidase proteins.
Neuraminidase breaks the bonds that hold new virus particles to the outside of an infected
cell; once these bonds are broken, new viruses are set free to infect other cells and spread
the infection. These drugs stop the activity of neuraminidase, thus limiting the spread of infec-
tion. They are effective against both types of influenza, A and B.55
The FDA has approved oseltamivir to treat children one year and older and prevent influenza
among children 13 years and older. Zanamivir is licensed to treat children 7 years of age and
older, but is not licensed for the prevention of influenza.
All of the drugs except zanamivir are taken orally in pill or suspension form. Zanamivir comes
in a dry powder and is inhaled using a device known as a “Diskhaler.”
On average, the drugs reduce the duration of flu symptoms by about one day if taken within
the first 48 hours after illness begins. As a preventive, antivirals also can significantly reduce
the chances of becoming ill during a flu outbreak in a family or community.
A recent analysis of data from previous studies of oseltamivir in children showed that earlier use
of the drug results in a greater reduction in the length of illness, its symptoms, and secondary
infections. Treatment begun within 24 hours of the onset of symptoms provided “clinically
meaningful improvements.”56
CHILDREN AND ANTIVIRAL MEDICATIONS FOR SEASONAL FLU
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On May 3, 2007, CDC issued Interim Guidance
for the Use of Facemasks and Respirators in Public
Settings during an Influenza Pandemic.  While
there is very little specific research about the
value of masks to protect people in public
settings, CDC’s interim recommendations
are based on the best judgment of public
health experts who relied in part on infor-
mation about the protective value of masks
in healthcare facilities.57
Facemasks are loose-fitting, disposable masks
that cover the nose and mouth. These include
products labeled as surgical, dental, medical,
isolation, and laser masks. Facemasks help
stop droplets from being spread by the per-
son wearing them. They also help keep
splashes or sprays from reaching the mouth
and nose of the person wearing the facemask.
They are not designed to protect the person
wearing them against breathing in minute
particles, such as the flu virus itself. Facemasks
should be used once and then thrown away,
but if there is a shortage, this recommenda-
tion may need to be reconsidered.58
CDC recommends that people consider
wearing a facemask during an influenza
pandemic if:
■ They are ill with the flu and think they
might have close contact with other peo-
ple, i.e., within about 6 feet;
■ They live with someone who has flu symp-
toms; or
■ They are in a crowded public place where
they might be in close contact with infect-
ed people.
A respirator is designed to reduce the expo-
sure of the wearer to airborne particles,
including particles containing flu virus. The
term “N95” is used to refer to a half-facepiece
filtering respirator designed, when used cor-
rectly, to filter out 95 percent of the particles
that could pass through. The filters are tested
with approximately a 0.3 micron particle,
which is the most penetrating size. Particles
smaller or larger than this will be filtered
more efficiently. Most of the time, N95 respi-
rators are used in industrial manufacturing,
construction and other jobs that involve dust
and small particles. Health care workers,
such as nurses and doctors, also use respira-
tors when taking care of patients with dis-
eases that can be spread through the air, like
tuberculosis.  At present, there is no federal-
ly-approved respirator for use by children.
To be most effective, these types of respira-
tors need to fit tightly to the face so that the
air is breathed through the filter material.
Respirators generally are not designed to
form a tight fit on people with very small
faces, such as children.59 In addition, respi-
rators are not recommended for anyone
with lung, heart, or other conditions which
interfere with breathing. 
CDC recommends that individuals should
consider wearing a respirator during an
influenza pandemic if they are well, but will
be in close contact with people who are
thought to be sick with pandemic flu. This
recommendation also applies to those tak-
ing care of an ill person at home. If a respi-
rator is unavailable, CDC recommends that
a facemask should be considered.60
Masks and respirators will not likely be able
to prevent all disease transmission. They are
only one step in disrupting the chain of
transmission. Individuals likely will be infec-
tious before they have symptoms, so it may
not be sufficient to simply put on a mask
once flu symptoms appear. Also, there will
likely be “contact” contagion, that is, infec-
tion transmitted by handling contaminated
items, in addition to droplets spread
through the air by coughing or sneezing.
Perhaps most importantly, there are serious
questions about how available facemasks
and respirators will be during a global flu
pandemic due to manufacturing constraints
and off-shore production issues.
Safety, design, and compliance are 3 of the
concerns with respect to facemask and res-
pirator use by children.  Currently, there are
no NIOSH-approved or FDA-cleared respi-
rators designed for children. However, some
FACEMASKS AND RESPIRATORS
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small-sized respirator facepieces may ade-
quately fit older children. While surgical
masks are not required to fit as tightly to the
face, they should not interfere with eyesight
and gaps should be minimized.
The likelihood that a child would use a face-
mask or a respirator properly is a significant
concern. Facemasks and respirators will not
serve their intended purpose if they are not
worn during appropriate times. Children may
not understand the importance of wearing a
mask and they may not be tolerant of having it
on their face for an extended period of time.
Because handling used facemasks and respira-
tors could also transmit the flu virus, wearers
should be trained in how to remove and dis-
pose of them safely. Careful handling of a con-
taminated mask or respirator may not be a rea-
sonable expectation of young children.
CDC recommends that all health care facili-
ties, including pediatricians’ offices and
clinics, take extra precautions in the event
of an influenza pandemic.  
Public health experts believe that human
influenza is primarily spread through large
respiratory droplets. Given the current uncer-
tainty about the exact modes by which avian
influenza may first be transmitted among
humans, CDC recommends additional pre-
cautions for healthcare workers who may con-
front suspected human cases of avian flu. 
These include standard precautions, such as
hand hygiene before and after all patient con-
tact, particularly with items that might have
become contaminated. CDC also recom-
mends that health professionals use gowns
and gloves, N95 respirators, eye protection,
such as goggles and face shields, as well as
“dedicated” equipment, such as disposable
blood pressure cuffs and thermometers.
They also urge physicians to place patients in
specially equipped airborne isolation rooms
with monitored negative air pressure in rela-
tion to corridor, with 6 to 12 air changes per
hour, and rooms that exhaust air directly out-
side or have recirculated air filtered by a high
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter.61
Pediatricians often have separate “well” and
“sick” waiting rooms for their young
patients. No one knows yet whether separate
waiting rooms will provide enough protec-
tion during a pandemic and few pediatric
INFECTION CONTROL IN HEALTH CARE FACILITIES
WHAT MAKES YOU THINK CHILDREN WOULD EVER KEEP THEM ON? OLDER
CHILDREN -- A MATURE 8-YEAR-OLD -- MAYBE, BUT MASKS ARE VERY UNCOMFORTABLE.
HAVING SOMETHING ON YOUR FACE IS SOMETHING CHILDREN DON’T LIKE. 
-- MARGARET FISHER, MD, FAAP, Chair of the Department of Pediatrics and Medical Director,
The Children’s Hospital at Monmouth Medical Center, Long Branch, New Jersey.
“
”
HAVE YOU EVER TRIED TO PUT A MASK ON A 3-YEAR-OLD? THE PLACE WHERE
A MASK MIGHT BE VALUABLE IS IN A HOSPITAL SETTING WHERE IT COULD BE ENFORCED.
YOU CAN’T ENFORCE IT ELSEWHERE BECAUSE, IF IT’S UNSUPERVISED, THE MINUTE
YOU TURN YOUR BACK ON A CHILD, THE MASK COMES OFF. AND I DON’T BLAME THE
KIDS -- THEY’RE UNCOMFORTABLE.
-- JOHN S. BRADLEY, MD, FAAP, Children’s Hospital of San Diego, California.
“
”
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practices or clinics would have sufficient iso-
lation rooms.  When separate isolation
rooms are not feasible, physicians should
make masks available to symptomatic
patients who are able to wear them (adult
and pediatric sizes should be available) and
provide facial tissues, receptacles for their
disposal, and hand hygiene materials in
waiting areas and examination rooms.62
If separate waiting rooms or separate venti-
lation systems became impractical or too
expensive, pandemic flu could inspire the
return of house calls, a practice which large-
ly disappeared during the 1960s. Larger
patient practice loads and managed care
drove house calls into near-extinction. It
became impractical, costly, and inefficient
for pediatricians to visit sick children in
their homes, particularly if lab work needed
to be performed. However, home visits
could become a useful effective infection
control approach in the event of influenza
pandemic -- as long as pediatricians them-
selves take appropriate precautions when
making home visits.  
HAVING WELL AND SICK WAITING ROOMS MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT, BUT THE BIG
PROBLEM IS THAT PEOPLE ARE CONTAGIOUS A DAY BEFORE THEY GET SYMPTOMS. IN
MOST OFFICES, THE AIR IS RECIRCULATED INTO EXAM ROOMS -- WE REALLY WOULD
HAVE TO KNOW MORE ABOUT HOW LONG THE VIRUS STAYS ALIVE IN THE AIR. SEPARATE
VENTILATION SYSTEMS ARE PROBABLY TOO EXPENSIVE.  WE WILL NEED TO HAVE
INFORMATION ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE VIRUS PARTICLES. BIG DROPLETS FALL TO THE
GROUND BUT SMALL ONES STAY AIRBORNE. IF THEY TRULY ARE SMALL, AIRBORNE
PARTICLES, THEN SYSTEMS DO MATTER.
-- Margaret Fisher, MD, FAAP, Chair of the Department of Pediatrics and Medical Director,
The Children’s Hospital at Monmouth Medical Center, Long Branch, New Jersey.
“
”
HOUSE CALLS USED TO BE POPULAR BECAUSE PEOPLE DIDN’T HAVE
TRANSPORTATION TO THE DOCTOR’S OFFICE. ONCE TRANSPORTATION BECAME AVAIL-
ABLE, IT BECAME MUCH EASIER TO SEE A CHILD IN THE OFFICE, ESPECIALLY SINCE A
DOCTOR MAKING HOUSE CALLS DOESN’T HAVE THE BACKUP FACILITIES TO DO LAB
TESTS AND BLOOD WORK. BUT IF PEOPLE ARE WORRIED ABOUT VECTORS (INFECTED
CHILDREN) GOING OUT, HOUSE CALLS COULD BECOME USEFUL AGAIN. WE COULD
TAKE A PLACE LIKE KANSAS CITY, AND DIVIDE IT INTO GRIDS, THEN ASSIGN GRIDS
AMONG THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PEDIATRICIANS’ OFFICES. WE’D HAVE TO MAKE HOUSE
CALLS WEARING MASKS, AND PEOPLE WOULD HAVE TO BE TAUGHT HOW TO PROVIDE
INTRAVENOUS FLUIDS AT HOME. IT WOULD REQUIRE A DIFFERENT HEALTH SYSTEM
THAN THE ONE WE ARE FAMILIAR WITH NOW. THE SICKEST CHILDREN WOULD BE IN
THE HOSPITALS, AND THE OTHERS COULD STAY HOME AND BE SEEN THERE.
-- KURT METZL, MD, FAAP, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Medicine, 
Kansas City, Missouri.
“
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Hospitals treating children infected with pan-
demic influenza also will face major chal-
lenges. Finding additional medical surge
capacity, confronting potential health care
workforce shortages due to illness or respon-
sibilities for caring for sick family members,
and anticipating disruptions in delivery of
medical supplies and drugs are issues likely
to confront all hospital administrators.
However when it comes to pandemic plan-
ning with respect to children and adoles-
cents, hospital officials need to consider that
children may be admitted and/or discharged
without a supervising adult due to the parent
or guardian’s illness, death, or other care-giv-
ing issues, which in turn complicates consent
for treatment.63 Advance planning for the
physical, emotional, and psychological needs
of very sick children, who also may be expe-
riencing bereavement due to the loss of a
family member or friend, is vital. 
Rapid diagnosis during a pandemic outbreak
will be essential for complying with isolation
recommendations and early treatment.
Currently available rapid flu tests cannot be
used to identify a pandemic strain of flu.  As
of now, tests for possible pandemic strains
would have to be sent to special laboratories
and would take longer for results.  
Pediatricians’ offices, emergency rooms,
and health clinics -- especially those located
in rural and isolated geographic settings --
typically are not close enough to the sophis-
ticated lab equipment needed to perform
such diagnostics as a viral culture, poly-
merase chain reaction (PCR), rapid antigen
testing, or immunofluorescence, which are
tests that are used to identify specific flu
strains, such as H5N1 or other strains of
avian flu. 
Also, the accuracy of laboratory tests may
vary by strain. It could take days, even weeks,
between a throat or a nasal swab and a final
reading. Moreover, only CDC and a few other
international labs have the high-level biosafe-
ty facilities needed to perform specialized
tests that reveal critical details about a virus’s
geographic origin and other features. 
RAPID DIAGNOSTICS TESTS EXIST FOR SEASONAL FLU. WE USE THEM A LOT. 
WE USE THEM TO CONFIRM FLU CASES. IF THERE WAS AVIAN FLU AROUND, IT WOULD
BE VERY USEFUL TO HAVE A RAPID TEST.
-- KURT METZL, MD, FAAP, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Medicine, 
Kansas City, Missouri.
“
”
PART VI: Diagnostics
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Most public health experts agree that additional tools are needed that can rapidly diagnose pan-
demic flu strains at the point of care where patients are first seen and treated after they become
ill. These would include physicians’ offices, urban and rural clinics, and hospital emergency rooms,
among other sites. 
PCR technology
In February 2006, FDA licensed a new laboratory test that uses PCR technology -- a process
that amplifies gene sequences -- and can detect H5 strains of flu, including H5N1, within 4
hours after arriving at a lab. Previous testing technology required at least 2 to 3 days. The test
is called the Influenza A/H5 (Asian lineage) Virus Real-time RT-PCR Primer and Probe Set. If
the presence of the H5 strain is identified, then further testing is conducted to identify the
specific H5 subtype (for e.g., H5N1). The use of this test is limited to laboratories designated
by the Laboratory Response Networks, with about 140 facilities in the United States.64
New microchip test
The flu diagnostics field has been moving rapidly. Scientists from the University of Colorado at
Boulder and CDC have developed an inexpensive “gene chip” test based on a single flu virus
gene that could allow scientists to quickly identify flu viruses, including avian influenza H5N1.
The researchers used the “MChip” to detect H5N1 in samples collected over a 3-year period
from people and animals in geographically diverse locales. In tests on 24 H5N1 viral isolates,
the chip provided complete information about virus type and subtype in 21 cases and gave no
false positive results. The “MChip” could provide a significant advantage over available tests
because it is based on a single gene segment that mutates less often than the flu genes typically
used in diagnostic tests. As a result, the MChip may not need to be updated as frequently to
keep up with the changing virus.65
The MChip has several advantages over the FluChip, a flu diagnostic previously developed by
the same research team and announced in August 2006. While the FluChip is based on 3
influenza genes -- hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA) and matrix (M) -- the MChip is based
on 1 gene segment. Unlike HA and NA, which mutate constantly and thus are technically diffi-
cult to use to develop gene chip diagnostic tests, the M gene segment mutates much less rapidly.
The researchers believe that a test based on this relatively unchanging gene segment will contin-
ue to provide accurate results even as the HA and NA genes mutate over time. Another poten-
tial advantage is that the MChip would, for the first time, create a way to simultaneously screen
large numbers of flu samples to learn both the type and subtype of virus present. Current real-
time tests provide information about the type of virus (type A or B) in a sample, but additional
tests must be run to determine the virus subtype (for example, H5N1 subtype.)66
This work -- and the FluChip research announced last summer -- are regarded as important
incremental steps in diagnostics. The raw materials for the MChip cost less than 10 dollars,
and discussions are under way to commercialize its manufacture.67
NEW DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS
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It is critical that the health and welfare of
children are considered in all aspects of
pandemic influenza planning. This requires
support and collaboration from multiple
partners at the local, state, and federal lev-
els. Although many of the pandemic flu
issues relevant to adults are also relevant to
children, there remain several issues unique
to children and adolescents that require
recognition and attention in the ongoing
extensive efforts to explore our nation’s
readiness for influenza pandemic. 
TFAH and AAP recommend that the follow-
ing actions be taken to better protect the
nation’s children in the event of a severe
influenza pandemic. These recommenda-
tions reflect the views of TFAH and AAP and
do not necessarily reflect the views of those
individuals interviewed for this paper or
those who served as peer-reviewers.
■ Primary care providers, such as pediatri-
cians and pediatric medical and surgical
subspecialists, should be included in pan-
demic planning at all levels of government.
■ The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services should conduct addition-
al studies on vaccine efficacy in young chil-
dren, support the development of addi-
tional flu vaccine products, and conduct
more studies of antiviral agents for infants. 
■ The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services should immediately con-
vene an independent task force to study
and make specific recommendations
about the use of surgical masks, N95 res-
pirators, and other personal protective
equipment by children.
■ HHS should conduct further studies on
the feasibility of prolonged school and
childcare center closures, including a
more precise assessment of the long-term
interruption of the school meals pro-
grams and how to mitigate the impact on
students who rely on them.
■ The federal government should ensure
that the Strategic National Stockpile
includes sufficient pediatric doses of
antiviral medications to ensure treatment
of 25 percent of the nation’s children and
adolescents, or about 18.4 million individ-
uals.  This will require additional procure-
ment of the flavored liquid Tamiflu over
the 100,000 treatment courses already
purchased by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. 
■ HHS should provide guidelines to state
and local health departments for evaluat-
ing hospital surge capacity (i.e., equip-
ment, personnel, etc.) for children. 
CHILDREN AND YOUTH ARE PART OF A COMPLEX SOCIAL NETWORK THAT
SUPPORTS THEM AS THEY GROW, LEARN AND DEVELOP.  THE RAMIFICATIONS OF A PAN-
DEMIC ARE SIGNIFICANT FOR THIS VULNERABLE POPULATION; HENCE APPROPRIATE
PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC MUST ADDRESS THE PHYSICAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL IMPACT THE DISEASE WILL HAVE ON CHILDREN,
YOUTH AND THEIR CAREGIVERS. 
-- FROM “PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH: WHO’S LOOKING OUT FOR
OUR KIDS?” HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT FORUM/CANADIAN COLLEGE OF HEALTH SERVICE
EXECUTIVES, SPRING 2007.
“
”
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■ All schools should educate students in
infection control. Children should receive
grade-appropriate health education about
communicable diseases and methods to
interrupt disease spread (cover cough,
wash hands, etc). This education should
include discussion of actions that might
take place during a severe epidemic, such
as prolonged school closures. Materials
are available through many federal and
state agencies -- particularly public health
agencies -- to enable educators to deter-
mine appropriate activities.
■ Educators and school administrators
should be encouraged to get an annual
influenza vaccination and should remind
families that public health experts recom-
mend annual flu vaccines for 1) all chil-
dren with high risk conditions who are 6
months of age and older; 2) all healthy
children ages 6 months through 59
months; 3) all household contacts and
out-of-home caregivers of children with
high risk conditions and of children
younger than 5 years if age; and 4) all
health care professionals.  CDC and state
and local health official departments
should encourage and support seasonal
flu vaccination clinics in school settings to
maximize flu vaccine coverage rates.
■ Educators and public health officials
should consider the potential psychologi-
cal ramifications on the student popula-
tion before, during, and after a pandem-
ic. Psychologists and grief counselors
should be made available, by telephone if
face-to-face encounters are not immedi-
ately possible, to help students cope with
illness and loss of family, fellow students,
and friends.
■ Educators and public health officials
should plan for “influenza free” daycare
centers (with availability of point-of-care
rapid testing for symptomatic children)
to allow working parents who are essential
to maintaining a functioning society and
economy, to continue to go to work.
Avian (or bird) flu is caused by influenza A
viruses that occur naturally among wild
birds and can affect a variety of domestic
and wild bird species. Infection can range
from asymptomatic to severe, depending on
the virulence of the virus and the suscepti-
bility of the avian host. Several different
avian influenza strains have been shown to
infect humans. These include viruses of the
H5 subtype (H5N1), the H7 subtype
(H7N2, H7N3, H7N7), the H9 subtype
(H9N2), and the H10 subtype (H10N7).80
Global public health authorities are especial-
ly worried about a strain of avian flu known as
H5N1. It is deadly to domestic fowl and sev-
eral species of wild birds and can be passed
from birds to humans. In recent years it has
been circulating largely in Asia, and has
proved especially dangerous to humans who
become infected. The chief concern is that
H5N1 could undergo mutations consistent
with an antigenic shift that will make human-
to-human transmission efficient and sus-
tained, raising the likelihood of a pandemic.
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There are 3 types of influenza viruses, classi-
fied as type A, B, or C, based upon their pro-
tein composition. Type A viruses widely cir-
culate in many kinds of animals, including
ducks, chickens, pigs, whales, and also in
humans, and cause epidemics and pan-
demics. The type B virus widely circulates in
humans, causing epidemics but not pan-
demics. Type C has been found in humans,
pigs, and dogs and causes mild respiratory
infections, but does not cause epidemics.77
Type A influenza concerns public health
officials the most. It was  responsible for the
1918, 1957, and 1968 pandemics. Type A
viruses are subdivided into groups based on
two surface proteins on the virus, hemag-
glutinin, (HA), and neuraminidase (NA).
Scientists have characterized 16 HA sub-
types and nine NA subtypes.78 These are
often represented as H1 through H16 and
N1 through N9. 
Influenza viruses are constantly changing
and evolving. These genetic changes may be
small and continuous or large and abrupt.
Small, continuous changes occur in type A
and type B influenza as the virus replicates,
that is, makes copies of itself. These types of
changes are known as antigenic drift. This
happens continuously, causing new strains
of virus that are not recognized by the
human immune system. This is why a new
flu vaccine must be produced annually to
protect against the year’s most commonly
occurring strains.
Type A influenza also undergoes infrequent
and sudden extensive changes, called anti-
genic shift. Antigenic shift occurs when two
different flu strains infect the same cell and
exchange genetic material. The novel re-
assortment of HA or NA proteins in a shift-
ed virus creates a new influenza A subtype.
Because people may have little or no immu-
nity to such a new subtype, their appearance
tends to coincide with pandemics.79 The
pandemics of 1957 and 1968 were caused by
a genetic re-assortment that occurred
between human influenza viruses and low
pathogenic avian influenza viruses.
APPENDIX A: Influenza Viruses: A Primer
Avian Flu Viruses
Courtesy of Anthony S. Fauci, MD,
Director, National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases
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ACIP and NVAC: The Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices and the National
Vaccine Advisory Committee, both advisory
panels that study vaccines and make recom-
mendations to the federal government
regarding how and when to use them.
Adjuvant: An adjuvant is a substance that
helps and enhances the pharmacological
effect of a drug or increases the ability of a
vaccine antigen to stimulate the immune
system. When used in vaccines, it can result
in fewer or lower doses, thus helping to con-
serve a vaccine’s overall supply.
Antigen: An antigen is any substance that is for-
eign to the body that that evokes an immune
response.
Antigenic drift: These are continuous small
changes that occur in type A and type B
influenza as the virus replicates, that is, makes
copies of itself. These changes, which typical-
ly happen with seasonal flu strains, mean that
adjustments need to be made annually to sea-
sonal flu vaccines.
Antigenic shift: These are infrequent and sud-
den large changes in Type A influenza, when
two different flu strains infect the same cell and
exchange genetic material. These new viruses
can be the source of influenza pandemics.
Antiviral: A drug used to combat viruses. These
drugs typically work by targeting - and disrupt-
ing - specific functions of the virus in order to
prevent or reduce infection, or treat illness.
Attenuated: When used to describe a live
vaccine, which means that the  vaccine is
made from live virus that is weakened, or
attenuated, making it strong enough to
prompt an immune response but too weak
to cause disease. 
Avian flu: A highly variable mild to severe
influenza that typically afflicts domestic and
wild birds and does not normally infect
humans, but which can mutate and be trans-
mitted to humans causing epidemics, or
pandemics. Avian flu is also called bird flu.
CDC: The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. The Federal agency, based in
Atlanta, responsible for investigating disease
outbreaks, preventing and controlling infec-
tious and chronic diseases, injuries, and
workplace hazards. www.cdc.gov.
Epidemic:  An epidemic is an outbreak of a
disease that can spread rapidly and widely,
but is regarded as less severe than a pan-
demic, which affects a global population.
Gene: A hereditary unit consisting of a
sequence of DNA that occupies a specific
location on a chromosome and determines
a particular characteristic in an organism.
Genes undergo mutation when their DNA
sequence changes.
Hemagglutinin: A protein found on the sur-
face of the influenza virus responsible for bind-
ing the virus to the cell that is being infected.
There are 16 subtypes, labeled H1 to H16.
Host cell: A host cell is the cell that is infect-
ed by a virus. A virus infects a cell and uses
the cell’s machinery to make copies of itself,
spreading the infection.
Mask: A device used to cover the nose and
mouth in order to prevent the transmission of
microorganisms, such as bacteria and viruses. 
Mutation:  A genetic change that occurs with-
in living organisms, enabling them to adapt
to certain conditions in order to survive.   
NIH: The National Institutes of Health, the
Federal government’s biomedical research
agency, at www.nih.gov. NIH consists of 20
individual institutes and seven centers, each
involved in a specific area of medical research.
NIAID: The National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases, at www.niaid.nih.gov, a
research institute within the National
Institutes of Health primarily concerned
with studying infectious disease. The NIAID
conducts its own research and also financial-
ly supports research conducted by non-gov-
ernment scientists and companies.
APPENDIX B:  Glossary of Terms and Acronyms
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NIOSH:  The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is
the federal agency responsible for conduct-
ing research and making recommendations
for the prevention of work-related injury
and illness. NIOSH is part of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
Neuraminidase: A protein on the surface of
the influenza virus responsible for promot-
ing the release of progeny viruses from
infected cells. There are nine known sub-
types, labeled N1 to N9.
Pandemic:  A disease epidemic that covers a
wide global area.
Pediatric: Pertaining to children.
Polymerase: Any of many enzymes that cat-
alyze the formation of DNA or RNA from
precursor substances in the presence of pre-
existing DNA or RNA acting as a template
Replication: The process by which a virus
makes copies of itself after entering (infect-
ing) a host cell.
Resistance:  The capacity of a species or
strain of microorganism to survive exposure
to a toxic agent, such as a drug, formerly
effective against it
Respirator: A device worn over the mouth or
nose or both to protect the respiratory tract. 
RNA:  Ribonucleic acid. One of the two
major classes of nucleic acid, mainly
involved in translating into proteins the
genetic information that is carried in
deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA. (see DNA)
Social distancing: A term used to describe a
public health intervention for isolation poli-
cies applied to specific groups, designed to
reduce personal interaction and thereby dis-
ease transmission. 
Stockpile: A supply stored for future use,
usually carefully accrued and maintained. In
the case of pandemic influenza, a national
stockpile has been created to store vaccines
and drugs.
Vaccine:  A preparation of a weakened or
killed pathogen, such as a bacterium or
virus, or of a portion of the pathogen’s
structure that stimulates the production of
protective antibodies or cellular immunity
against the organism.
Vector: An entity that carries disease-causing
microorganisms from one host to another.
In this context, it is used to describe chil-
dren who easily transmit infections because
of their active social interactions.
Virus: An agent that consists essentially of a
core of RNA or DNA surrounded by a pro-
tein coat. Viruses, which often cause disease,
cannot replicate without a host cell.
WHO: World Health Organization. WHO is
the United Nations specialized agency for
health. Information about WHO can be
found  at www.who.org.
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